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The Power of Numbers: Base-Ten Threshold Effects in Reported Revenue  
 
ABSTRACT 
We provide evidence that managers have a revealed preference for reporting total revenue 
numbers just above base-ten thresholds (i.e., “round” numbers) of the form N × 10K. Examples 
are $10 million (1 × 10
7
) and $4 billion (4 × 10
9
). Our finding is consistent with a literature in 
psychology demonstrating that humans are susceptible to a cognitive bias associated with base-
ten reference points. However, we also document several rational explanations for this revenue 
management behavior on the part of managers. First, analyst revenue forecasts also exhibit this 
regularity, especially in early forecasts when greater uncertainty can potentially induce analysts 
to rely to a greater extent on heuristics, suggesting that managers may be managing reported 
revenue numbers to meet externally-determined base-ten-influenced benchmarks. In addition, the 
effect that we document is stronger for firms that face greater pressure to report high revenue 
growth, while firms that exceed base-ten revenue thresholds for the first time benefit from 
increased press coverage. Finally, we show that the revenue growth needed to stretch for a base-
ten threshold is not sustainable; firms that just exceed base-ten thresholds have lower subsequent 
revenue growth. Given that managers engage in extra, and, on average, unsustainable efforts to 
increase revenues to reach base-ten thresholds, our results suggest that revenue manipulation is 
even more pervasive than previously documented and that lenders, investors, auditors, and 
regulators should apply an extra degree of skepticism when a reported revenue number just 
exceeds a base-ten threshold. 
 
Key words: Revenue Management, Base-Ten Thresholds, Analyst Forecast Heuristics, Revenue 
Quality 
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I. Introduction 
 The existence of salient numbers, or cognitive reference points, at base-ten thresholds 
(i.e., “round” numbers) has been well documented in the psychology literature. These base-ten 
thresholds take the general form of N × 10
K
, where N and K are integers. Examples are $1 
million (1 × 10
6
), $300 million (3 × 10
8
), $7 billion (7 × 10
9
), and so forth. Gabor and Granger 
(1966) and Rosch (1975) conclude that humans use numbers that are factors of ten as reference 
points when evaluating all other numbers. Schindler and Wiman (1989) suggest that round 
numbers are easier to remember and come to mind more readily, and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) find that when making decisions individuals give excess weight to information that is 
easily retrieved from memory. In this paper, we study the extent to which firms manage their 
reported accounting numbers in order to report revenue just above base-ten thresholds, and we 
provide evidence on some of the motivations and consequences associated with firms engaging 
in this revenue management behavior. 
Managers may desire to report revenues above a base-ten threshold for several reasons. 
Research in psychology and marketing demonstrates that consumers view prices ending in 99 
cents to be substantially lower than prices just one cent above (Brenner and Brenner 1982). This 
same cognitive bias may lead investors to value a company with $99 million in revenue 
substantially lower than an otherwise-similar company with $100 million in revenue. 
Additionally, a cognitive bias among investors, analysts, and business reporters may lead to an 
increase in visibility for firms reaching a base-ten threshold point. Firms that report revenues that 
meet or just beat a base-ten threshold may be more likely to capture the attention of investors and 
the financial press. This increase in attention could then lead to a net increase in buying by 
individual investors and a net increase in coverage by the media (Odean 1998; Barber and Odean 
2008).  
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These human perception explanations imply that there could be a disproportionate 
number of firms reporting revenue just above rather than just below base-ten thresholds as a 
result of opportunistic actions by managers exploiting a cognitive bias of investors, analysts, and 
business reporters. If this cognitive bias is prevalent among financial market participants, it 
would be rational for a manager to expend money and effort to reach a base-ten revenue 
threshold in order to attract more market attention or to enhance firm valuation. Possible 
consequences of this threshold-reaching revenue management behavior by managers are that 
reported revenues falling in these base-ten-related regions could be less reliable because they are 
more susceptible to strategic reporting by managers and could also be less persistent because 
they are achieved through unsustainable real activities or accruals management. 
Empirically, we use approximate randomization techniques to show that firms are 
significantly more likely to report revenues just above base-ten thresholds ($10 million, $200 
million, $7.0 billion, and so forth) than just below them. This base-ten revenue threshold effect 
exists independent of the reporting currency; our results hold for firms reporting in U.S. dollars 
and for firms reporting in a variety of non-U.S. currencies. We also find that the base-ten 
threshold effect exists in analysts’ forecasts of revenue and this effect is strongest in the earliest 
revenue forecasts, made when uncertainty about future revenues is the highest. This suggests that 
part of managers’ motivation to beat base-ten revenue thresholds may be a rational response to 
meet important external benchmarks. Additionally, we find that firms which reach the $500 
million or $1 billion revenue thresholds for the first time experience an increase in news 
coverage relative to the prior year and to a matched control sample, again indicating that rational 
managers have an incentive to reach a base-ten revenue threshold in order to increase firm 
visibility. We also find that this revenue threshold effect is stronger for firms with high past and 
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expected future revenue growth (firms for which revenue growth is often a key performance 
indicator). Lastly, we find that threshold-reaching firms experience lower revenue growth in the 
subsequent year compared to a control sample, suggesting that the increased revenue growth 
needed to reach a base-ten threshold is not sustainable. 
Our study has important implications for practitioners and academics. First, we document 
the existence of a base-ten threshold effect in reported revenues. Although prior research has 
documented a preference for base-ten thresholds in reported earnings (Carslaw 1988; Thomas 
1989), this result has not previously been documented with respect to revenue, an important 
metric in its own right. After earnings, revenues are the accounting number most widely 
followed by investors and analysts (Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007), and revenues have long 
been known to contain incremental information content beyond earnings (Swaminathan and 
Weintrop 1991; Davis 2002; Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006). Additionally, revenues are closely tied 
to future firm growth, and Ghosh et al. (2005) find that increases in earnings that are 
accompanied by revenue growth tend to be more persistent. However, recent research such as 
Dichev et al. (2013) has stressed the “one number” mentality of managers who focus on bottom 
line net income as the single most important number for internal decision-making and external 
reporting. With such a mentality, managers might care about reported revenue only to the extent 
that it impacts bottom-line net income. Our results provide evidence that the level of reported 
revenue itself is an important reporting metric to managers, independent of the contribution of 
revenue to overall income, and that the level of the reported revenue number is an object of 
strategic management. 
Second, our study provides novel evidence on both the motives and consequences of 
meeting base-ten thresholds. Thomas (1989) proposes two potential explanations for a base-ten 
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preference in reported accounting numbers—the “firm valuation perspective” which is that the 
market places a higher value on firms reporting round numbers and the “contractual parameter 
perspective” which is that contracts are often denominated in round numbers—but does not 
empirically test either of these theories. Our analyst, media, and expected revenue growth 
analyses provide evidence in general support of both of these theories. In addition, our results on 
realized future revenue growth provide a note of caution that the methods used to meet these 
base-ten revenue benchmarks result in reported revenue growth that is not sustainable. 
Finally, examining the base-ten threshold effect in revenues provides another avenue for 
exploring the quality of reported income-related numbers that is not possible from studying the 
distribution of earnings directly. By documenting the existence of revenue management around a 
large set of base-ten thresholds, we demonstrate the pervasive nature of benchmark-meeting 
behavior among managers. This result suggests that financial statement users should scrutinize 
the quality of both the revenue number and the earnings number in an income statement 
containing revenues just exceeding a base-ten threshold. In its Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 
titled “Materiality” (SEC 1999), the Securities and Exchange Commission notes that small 
changes in reported amounts may be material when those changes can influence or alter the 
impression those reported amounts make on the financial statement user. In that context, and 
given the significance of base-ten thresholds in the human decision-making process, base-ten 
threshold-reaching efforts by managers can constitute a material change to the reported revenue 
numbers. 
Our results imply that revenue numbers that just exceed a base-ten threshold should be 
cautiously interpreted in all contexts. The numbers that we study come from audited financial 
statements, so the base-ten threshold effect exists even in the presence of revenue management 
6 
 
constraints stemming from auditor oversight. It is likely that this base-ten threshold phenomenon 
also exists in the financial statements of privately-held businesses which are not subject to 
mandatory audits, and in internal accounting numbers such as revenue budgets, targets, and 
internal forecasts that are not externally reported. In short, given that audited numbers of 
publicly-traded companies are subject to high levels of outside monitoring and reporting 
restrictions, the base-ten threshold effect that we document is most likely a lower bound to the 
prevalence of this phenomenon for revenue numbers throughout the economy. 
 The next section reviews related literature and develops our hypotheses. Section III 
describes the sample and research design. Section IV presents the empirical results. We provide a 
summary and conclusion in Section V. 
 
II. Background and Hypothesis Development 
 Humans find base-ten reference points of the form N × 10
K
 easy to use and easy to 
remember. Studies that require participants to generate numbers have found a strong tendency of 
respondents to produce round numbers in a significantly higher frequency than would be 
expected by chance (Turner 1958; Higgins et al. 1977; Huttenlocher et al. 1990; Tarrant and 
Manfredo 1993; Whynes et al. 2005).  
 Additionally, several studies in the cognitive accessibility literature find evidence that 
consumers perceive numbers just below round numbers, for example $29.99, to be significantly 
smaller than the round number above, $30.00 (Gabor and Granger 1964; Schindler and Kirby 
1997). These findings are consistent with research in marketing that demonstrates that consumers 
view prices ending in 99 cents to be abnormally lower than prices just one cent above (Brenner 
and Brenner 1982). There are several explanations offered in the literature for these findings. The 
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“perceived gain” effect suggests that consumers frame 9-ending prices as round number prices 
and a small “gain,” and prices just above a round number as the round number and a small 
“loss.” Because consumers view losses very unfavorably, they strongly prefer to avoid those 
“losses” and are attracted to 9-ending prices (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Schindler and Kirby 
1997). In addition, the “truncation” effect suggests that consumers may fixate on the left-most 
digit when comparing prices and therefore underestimate 9-ending compared to 0-ending prices 
(Hinrichs et al. 1982; Poltrock et al. 1984). Lastly, the “image” effect suggests that consumers 
view 9-ending prices as conveying a sale or bargain and 0-ending prices as conveying quality 
(Stiving and Winer 1997; Bizer and Schindler 2005). 
 A large body of work in finance has documented that some types of psychological biases 
may affect financial decision making.
1
 If investors are susceptible to a cognitive bias associated 
with base-ten numbers in reported accounting data, then a likely place to observe that bias is in 
reported revenue and earnings because managers may anticipate that bias. A vast literature in 
accounting demonstrates that managers manage earnings to reach a variety of targets at which a 
perceived benefit is gained (Healy 1985; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Dichev and Skinner 
2002, Bartov et al. 2002, Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003, Dyreng et al. 2012). We believe it is 
interesting to specifically focus on thresholds in revenue for several reasons. After earnings, 
revenue is the most commonly monitored financial performance metric. Revenues have long 
been known to have incremental information content beyond earnings and are of great interest to 
investors (Swaminathan and Weintrop 1991). In addition, after earnings, revenues are the 
accounting number most widely followed by analysts (Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007). 
                                                          
1
 Models in behavioral finance have examined overconfidence with individuals overestimating the precision of their 
information signal (Daniel et al. 1998; Kyle and Wang 1997; Odean 1998), limited attention with individuals 
neglecting an information signal (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Peng and Xiang 2006), and cumulative prospect theory 
with individuals overestimating the likelihood of rare events (Barberis and Huang 2008). 
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Finally, as discussed in Stubben (2010), focusing on one component of earnings decreases noise 
and increases the power of tests to detect manipulation. This is especially the case in our setting 
where identifying potential manipulation in reported revenue to reach specific revenue targets 
casts light on the quality of earnings that would not be apparent by looking only at the 
distribution of earnings. 
 Several papers in accounting have been motivated by the cognitive reference point 
literature in psychology. Carslaw (1988) finds, for a sample of New Zealand firms, more zeros 
and fewer nines in the second digit of reported earnings than would be expected by chance, 
implying that at least some firms are stretching themselves to move from reported earnings of, 
say, $99 or $999 to $100 or $1,000, respectively. Thomas (1989) finds a similar pattern in 
reported earnings and EPS numbers for U.S. firms reporting profits, with the opposite result for 
firms reporting losses; firms are more likely to report losses ending in nines (a loss of $99) and 
less likely to report losses ending in zeros (a loss of $100). Das and Zhang (2003) provide 
evidence that firms tend to report earnings that will allow them to round up EPS to the nearest 
cent, and firms are more likely to round up when doing so will allow them to meet an external 
benchmark such as analyst forecasts. Finally, Bamber et al. (2010) find that managers are much 
more likely to issue 0- and 5-cent-ending forecasts of EPS than would be expected by chance and 
that these forecasts are less accurate and overly optimistic.
2
 Overall, these studies indicate the 
presence of cognitive reference points at base-ten thresholds for reported earnings numbers and 
provide motivation for our investigation of revenues. 
                                                          
2
 This result has a striking resemblance to completely unrelated work in medical research on self-reported body 
weights (Rowland, 1990; Visscher et al. 2006). Individuals display an end-digit preference for “0” and “5” when 
self-reporting weight, and this practice is related to underreporting of actual body weight. 
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 Rational managers are likely to be aware of this cognitive bias in terms of accounting 
numbers and base-ten thresholds and may exploit the bias. For example, there may be valuation 
implications for reaching a base-ten reference point. Thomas (1989) argues that if the $1.99 
phenomenon accurately describes investor behavior, then a small change in reported accounting 
numbers may have a disproportionately large effect on firm valuation.  
Pervasive numerical cognitive bias may lead to an increase in visibility for firms 
reporting accounting numbers just above a base-ten threshold number. Appendix 1 contains five 
examples (Starbucks, 1997; Callaway Golf, 2007; Heinz, 2008; Facebook, 2012; and the U.S. 
federal government, 2015) illustrating the emphasis base-ten thresholds are given in the press. 
Firms that report accounting numbers that meet or just beat a base-ten threshold may be more 
likely to capture the attention of investors and the financial press. This increase in attention may 
lead to a net increase in buying by individual investors and a net increase in coverage by the 
media. Odean (1998) proposes that investors limit their choice of stocks to those that have caught 
their attention because there are limits to how much information these individual investors can 
process in their search for stocks. Therefore, investors will be more likely to purchase stocks that 
have recently caught their attention. Barber and Odean (2008) provide evidence consistent with 
this “attention-grabbing” hypothesis and find that stocks that receive more attention in the 
financial press are more likely to be purchased by individual investors.
3
 
                                                          
3
 It can be argued that investors confront the same problem when selling stocks. However, most investors own a 
very small subset of available common stocks in their portfolio. Barber and Odean (2008) report that in their large 
brokerage dataset, the mean household held 4.3 stocks and the median household held 2.6 stocks. In addition, most 
individual investors do not short-sell stocks. This indicates that these investors will be able to take the time needed 
in considering whether or not to sell each stock in their portfolio. This leads to the argument that attention is a factor 
that influences the stocks that individual investors buy, but does not influence the stocks that individual investors 
sell. 
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 In addition, this cognitive bias with respect to base-ten reference points may permeate 
both contracts and quasi-contracts. If a cognitive bias increases the likelihood that contracts 
(such as loan agreements and management compensation schemes) and quasi-contracts (such as 
analyst and management forecasts of revenues and earnings) are denominated in round numbers, 
then managers actively seeking to reach these targets will be more likely to report accounting 
numbers just above a base-ten threshold than just below. Together, these valuation and 
contracting explanations suggest that rational managers have reasons to prefer reporting earnings 
and revenue numbers in excess of base-ten thresholds. 
 For the reasons given above, we predict that managers respond to the preference of 
market participants for revenues in excess of base-ten thresholds by managing revenues to meet 
or exceed those thresholds. Although previous studies have shown that firms’ reported earnings 
are more often just above base-ten reference points than would be expected by chance (Carslaw 
1988; Thomas 1989), it has not been shown whether this same pattern exists for reported 
revenue. In addition, because the base-ten threshold revenue effect we predict to find is the result 
of a human cognition bias focused on numbers, not economic values, it should therefore be 
independent of the reporting currency. Formally, we predict: 
H1:  Firms are more likely to report revenues that are just above a base-ten threshold than 
just below, regardless of the reporting currency. 
 
 
 We also investigate some of the motives that lead managers to exhibit this base-ten 
threshold-reaching behavior. Analyst forecasts are a form of quasi-contract, setting a 
performance expectation for both managers and market participants. As such, managers have an 
incentive to report numbers that meet these forecast levels. If revenue forecasts exhibit the 
existence of a base-ten threshold, this is one more reason for the reported revenue numbers 
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themselves to exhibit this same threshold effect. It is reasonable to expect this effect in analyst 
forecasts because financial analysts, like all humans, fixate to some extent on base-ten 
thresholds. Herrmann and Thomas (2005) document that analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share 
(EPS) end in the digits “0” and “5” at a much great frequency than do actual EPS. Bamber et al. 
(2010) document a pattern of “heaping” in their sample of management earnings forecasts. We 
predict the existence of a similar effect around base-ten thresholds in revenue forecasts. 
H2a:  Analysts are more likely to issue revenue forecasts that are just above a base-ten 
threshold than just below. 
 
Herrmann and Thomas (2005) provide evidence that forecast “heaping” is more likely to 
come from analysts that are less informed, exert less effort, and have fewer resources, and they 
suggest that this result is consistent with a behavioral bias. This tendency might be expected to 
be especially strong in the face of greater uncertainty, necessitating greater use of heuristics, such 
as base-ten rounding, in making forecasts. Information uncertainty is greater when the 
forecasting horizon is longer. Accordingly, we make the following prediction. 
H2b:  The base-ten revenue threshold effect is stronger for revenue forecasts made early in 
the year than for revenue forecasts made just before the announcement of actual 
revenue.  
 
If managers of firms expect a valuation benefit from reaching base-ten revenue 
thresholds, then we should observe variation in the magnitude of the threshold effect when this 
expected valuation benefit varies cross-sectionally. In particular, firms with a high sensitivity to 
revenue news are more likely to benefit from beating these benchmarks. Accordingly, the 
managers of these firms may be more likely to exert efforts in order to report revenue above a 
base-ten threshold. We suggest that firms with high price-to-sales ratios or high past revenue 
growth are particularly sensitive to revenue news. These firms are expected by the market to 
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have especially high future revenue growth, and thus the potential stock price penalty to them of 
not reaching a seemingly-attainable base-ten threshold will be greater than for other firms. We 
predict the following. 
H3a:  The base-ten revenue threshold effect is greater for those firms with a higher price-to-
sales ratio.  
 
H3b:  The base-ten revenue threshold effect is greater for those firms with higher past 
revenue growth.  
 
Market participants susceptible to a cognitive bias associated with base-ten threshold 
numbers may pay more attention to firms reporting revenue above a threshold.  Because this 
increased public visibility can have a positive valuation effect, as mentioned above, it is rational 
for managers to engage in efforts to manage reported revenue to exceed base-ten thresholds. We 
predict that firms that reach a base-ten threshold in reported revenue will experience an increase 
in visibility manifested by an increase in coverage in the financial media.  Formally, 
H4:  Firms reporting revenues just above a base-ten threshold will experience a greater 
increase in news coverage relative to a set of control firms.  
 
Lastly, a firm reporting revenue just above a base-ten threshold is potentially more likely 
than an average firm to have engaged in unsustainable efforts or revenue management in order to 
get the visibility and valuation benefits described above. An extensive literature in accounting 
documents managers achieving earnings and revenue targets through “real” and “accruals-based” 
earnings management (see e.g., Jones 1991, Roychowdhury 2006, Stubben 2010, Zang 2012). 
Identifying which particular method, or mix of methods, managers might utilize to achieve a 
base-ten threshold in a particular case is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we do posit 
that stretching to reach a base-ten revenue threshold (whether through accruals or through 
unmaintainable effort or sales practices) represents reported revenue growth that is, in part, 
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artificial and therefore unsustainable. Accordingly, we predict that revenue growth for threshold-
exceeding firms will be lower, relative to a benchmark set of firms, in the following year. 
H5:  Firms reporting revenues just above a base-ten threshold will report lower revenue 
growth in the following year relative to a control set of firms.  
 
 
III. Sample and Research Design 
Sample Selection 
Our initial sample is the entire population of Compustat and Osiris firms for all years 
1950 through 2014 for Compustat and 1982 through 2014 for Osiris. We primarily focus on U.S. 
firms and begin with all Compustat firm-years for which the total asset value is non-missing and 
positive; this yields 363,905 firm-years. We then delete firm-years with negative or missing 
values of total revenue, leaving a sample of 350,945 firm-years. Our tests focus on revenue 
observations just below and just above base-ten thresholds, but we use all of the available data to 
generate the approximate randomization test statistics based on the empirical distribution of 
revenue observations just below and just above randomly-chosen revenue thresholds.
4
 The 
number of firm-years, by decade and by data source, is given in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
Research Design 
In order to determine whether there are an unexpectedly large number of firms with total 
revenue just above base-ten thresholds, we use approximate randomization techniques which rely 
on the properties of randomly-generated distributions as discussed in Noreen (1989). Other 
                                                          
4
 The tails of the revenue distribution have only a small number of observations which fall in any given range of 
potential revenue values. These sparsely populated regions lead to wide variation in the ratio of observations in the 
regions just above/below the potential comparison thresholds that we use in our approximate randomization 
procedures (described below).  In Appendix 2 we describe how we discard the tails of the distribution by requiring a 
minimum number of observations in all intervals of a certain width; an almost equivalent procedure would be to 
simply truncate the extreme tails at the 1% and 99% levels. Our results are insensitive to this alternative procedure. 
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papers in the accounting literature, including Dichev and Skinner (2002), have used similar 
methods. In summary,  our method involves calculating the ratio of the number of observations 
in the interval (or “bin”) just above base-ten thresholds to the number of observations in the bin 
just below and then comparing this above/below ratio to the value of ratios for a set of pseudo-
thresholds generated from the empirical distribution using random sampling techniques. An 
above/below ratio around base-ten thresholds that is significantly larger than the ratios around 
other points along the number line is evidence that firms manage their revenues to be just above 
these benchmarks. In later tests, we also extend this method using a ratio-of-ratios approach 
which allows us to compare the magnitude of the base-ten threshold effect in revenues with 
various other benchmarks such as cost of goods sold and total assets. 
For convenience, we transform the revenue data by computing the base-ten logarithm of 
each revenue number. This transformation results in a revenue distribution that is approximately 
normal (although a normal distribution is not necessary for our methodology) and, most 
importantly, results in a natural scaling of the data because the width of bins can be interpreted in 
terms of percentage changes instead of absolute changes. Prior literature has discussed the need 
to scale when examining discontinuities in earnings distributions (see Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997, Burgstahler and Chuk 2015) because larger firms are able to manage larger absolute 
amounts near thresholds. The log approach effectively allows the revenue numbers themselves to 
serve as the scaling variable for the bin widths, avoiding the problems associated with other 
scalars such as price (see Durtschi and Easton 2005, 2009, and Burgstahler and Chuk 2015). The 
changes in logged revenue can then easily be converted back to percentage changes in unlogged 
revenue; for example, a 0.0100 change in logged revenue translates to a change of 2.33%. 
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We identify 53 potential threshold points that we expect to be salient to managers, 
investors, and other market participants. The potential threshold points range from $100,000 to 
$80 billion; we do not examine potential thresholds outside this range because very few firms 
covered by Compustat report revenue values larger or smaller than this. Each order of magnitude 
(10
5
, 10
6
, through 10
9
) includes nine intermediate threshold points such as $100,000, $200,000, 
$300,000, up through $900,000; the final order of magnitude, 10
10
, includes only 8 potential 
threshold points up to $80 billion. 
In order to identify whether there are significantly more firms with total revenue just 
above than just below base-ten thresholds, we first assign observations into intervals or bins 
around each potential threshold point according to the logged value of annual revenue. Around 
each threshold point we construct two bins, labeled the BELOW bin and the ABOVE bin. If 
managers perceive there to be some benefit to reporting revenue greater than or equal to a base-
ten threshold, then we expect a larger number of observations in bins just above base-ten 
thresholds than in bins just below those same thresholds. To illustrate, consider the case of log 
0.0100 bin widths and the bins 8.9900 and 9.0000. The bin 8.9900 includes all firm-years with 
reported revenue greater than or equal to $977,237,221 ($1 × 10
8.9900
) and less than 
$1,000,000,000 ($1 × 10
9.0000
). An increase in reported revenue from the bottom of the bin 
($977,237,221) to the top of the bin ($1,000,000,000) represents a revenue increase of 2.33%. 
The adjacent bin 9.0000 includes all firm-years with reported revenue greater than or equal to 
$1,000,000,000 ($1 × 10
9.0000
) and less than $1,023,292,992 ($1 × 10
9.0100
). Again, an increase in 
reported revenue from the bottom of the bin to the top of the bin represents a revenue increase of 
2.33%. Thus, even though the absolute dollar width of the two bins is different ($22,762,779 
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versus $23,292,992), the width of each bin, relative to the bottom threshold of the bin, is the 
same, 2.33%.
5
 
We report results using several bin widths: log 0.0010 (0.23% of revenue), 0.0025 
(0.58% of revenue), 0.0050 (1.16% of revenue), 0.0100 (2.33% of revenue), 0.0200 (4.71% of 
revenue), 0.0250 (5.93% of revenue), 0.0400 (9.65% of revenue), 0.0500 (12.20% of revenue), 
0.0750 (18.85% of revenue), and 0.1000 (25.89% of revenue). As demonstrated later, 
considering which bin widths display significant results can give some indication of the 
magnitude of the flexibility firms have, on average, to reach base-ten threshold points. 
We compute the test statistic, Sj, by summing the number of observations in the bins just 
above all base-ten thresholds, the ABOVE bins, and dividing by the sum of the number of 
observations in the bins just below all base-ten thresholds, the BELOW bins. The subscript j 
denotes the various bin widths, from log 0.0010 up through log 0.1000. If managers try to 
increase revenue to be above base-ten thresholds, we would expect the Sj ratio to be greater than 
1. 
(1)     𝑆𝑗 =
∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑊𝑗
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐵𝑖
𝑊𝑗
𝑖=1
 
where i=1,…,Wj are the base-ten threshold points, Wj is the number of threshold points for a 
given bin width j, up to a maximum of 53, and Ai and Bi represent the number of observations in 
the ABOVE and BELOW bins within width j of threshold i, respectively.
6
 
                                                          
5
 Defining the bin widths to be equal in percentage terms implies that the upper bin for a given revenue number is 
always larger, in absolute terms, than the lower bin. In untabulated results, we also perform our analysis with 
ABOVE and BELOW bins for each threshold point constrained to be equal in absolute terms; there is no change in 
our inferences. The empirical distributions generated in our approximate randomization tests (described later) 
naturally control for this difference in absolute size of the BELOW and ABOVE bins. 
6
 There is a maximum value of 53 base-ten thresholds, but many of the tests do not include all of the potential base-
ten thresholds because of sample size restrictions detailed in Appendix 2. For example, the log 0.0010 bin-width 
results reported in Table 2 include only 43 of the 53 thresholds, while the wider 0.0250 bin width allows for the 
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We use an approximate randomization test to determine whether the Sj ratio is 
significantly greater than one. We generate pseudo values of Sj, ?̂?𝑗, by randomly selecting Wj 
pseudo threshold points without replacement from the entire set of reported revenue numbers and 
then counting the number of observations in the ABOVE and BELOW bins relative to these 
pseudo threshold points. We repeat this process 9,999 times and count the number of times, r, 
that the randomly-generated pseudo-statistic ?̂?𝑗  is greater than or equal to the originally-
computed value of Sj. Following Noreen (1989), the approximate randomization p-value is 
computed as follows: 
(2)    𝑃(𝑆𝑗) =  
𝑟+1
9,999+1
 
where 𝑟 = ∑ 𝐼(9,999𝑗=1 ?̂?𝑗 ≥ 𝑆𝑗), I is the indicator function, and j is the bin width. We repeat this 
procedure for each different bin width, j, from log 0.0010 (0.23% of revenue) through log 0.1000 
(25.9% of revenue). For example, assume that the actual value of Sj is 1.20 and that of the 9,999 
randomly-selected sets of bins, none resulted in a pseudo-statistic ?̂?𝑗  value as large as 1.20. In 
this case, the value of P(Sj) is 0.0001 = ((0+1)/(9,999+1)). This test thus allows us to estimate the 
significance of the base-ten threshold effect, using randomly-chosen points in the empirical 
distribution as the benchmark group.  
In their work on base-ten thresholds in net income, Carslaw (1988) and Thomas (1989) 
use a methodology of looking at deviations of second digits from their expected frequencies, 
based on Benford’s Law.7 By examining the distribution of observations throughout the range of 
possible values, instead of just the distribution of second digits, the approximate randomization 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
examination of all 53 potential thresholds. This variation in the number of thresholds examined occurs because 
narrow bins are more likely to include few or no observations at the extreme tails of the distribution of observations.  
7
 Benford’s Law is an empirical regularity whereby certain digits are more likely to occur in the leading positions of 
numbers in naturally-generated data; Benford’s Law is discussed further in Section IV. 
18 
 
technique that we use essentially sidesteps issues related to Benford’s Law while controlling for 
the actual empirical distribution of accounting numbers. The benefit of this technique is that we 
are not required to make any assumptions about the statistical properties of the reported revenue 
distribution. Also, the approximate randomization technique allows us to examine the magnitude 
of the flexibility firms have to stretch reported revenue to reach a threshold because we can 
precisely vary the size of the interval (bin) above and below the thresholds that we examine. The 
second-digits methodology employed by Carslaw and Thomas is constrained to examine non-
adjustable bin widths of varying relative sizes. For example, the relative size of any revenue 
management activity to move a firm from $990,000 in revenue to $1,000,000 in revenue is much 
smaller (1.01%) than to move a firm from $1,900,000 in revenue to $2,000,000 in revenue 
(5.26%), and yet both these two cases are treated the same with the second-digits methodology. 
Finally, as discussed below, our approach makes it easy to directly compare the threshold effect 
across two sets of firms or reported numbers. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
As an initial illustration of the components of the Sj statistics for the set of base-ten 
thresholds, Table 2 contains the total number of firm-year observations falling in the ABOVE 
and BELOW bins for base-ten revenue thresholds using log 0.0010 bin widths on either side of 
the thresholds. For each threshold, we also include a binomial probability as an initial measure of 
the significance of the effect at each base-ten threshold point. If the distribution of logged 
revenue observations is uniform, then the number of observations in adjacent bins should be 
equal; in other words, using any revenue observation as the midpoint for the construction of bins, 
the probability of other revenue observations that fall in either the BELOW or ABOVE bin being 
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in the ABOVE bin is 50%. Although the overall revenue distribution is clearly not uniformly 
distributed, small intervals in a smooth distribution are likely to be approximately uniform. We 
check the reasonableness of this assumption by computing the probability of nearby observations 
(within log 0.0010 below and above) falling in the ABOVE bin for all of the intervals within the 
full range of revenue observations. For the entire sample, this probability is 50.4%. For 
observations below the median value of $75.9 million, the ABOVE probability is 50.9%; for 
observations above the median value of $75.9 million, the probability is 49.8%. This difference 
reflects the increasing then decreasing frequency of observations in a normal distribution. 
Overall, the 50% assumption underlying the binomial test provides a reasonable basis for initial 
measures of statistical significance; however, subsequent tests use the empirical distribution of 
the observations to create a more precise test statistic. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The results in Table 2, Panel A indicate that, for all base-ten threshold levels, there are 
more reported revenue observations in the log 0.0010 bin just above the threshold than in the bin 
just below the threshold.
8
 For example, there are 148 firm-year revenue observations in the bin 
7.0000 [greater than or equal to $10,000,000 ($1 × 10
7.0000
) and less than $10,023,052 ($1 × 
10
7.0010
)] compared to just 66 firm-year revenue observations in the bin 6.9990 [greater than or 
equal to $9,977,001 ($1 × 10
6.9990
) and less than $10,000,000 ($1 × 10
7.0000
)]. For all base-ten 
thresholds, the value of S0.0010, the ratio of the number of ABOVE observations to BELOW 
observations, is 1.55. Panel B contains results for only the most prominent subset of base-ten 
                                                          
8
 Table 2 includes only 43 of the 53 possible thresholds that we examine in this study because the 0.0010 bin width, 
unlike wider bin widths, is too narrow to include enough observations to meet our minimum observation criterion 
for values at the tails of the distribution. Our minimum observation criterion is explained in detail in Appendix 2. 
20 
 
thresholds: $1 million, $10 million, $100 million, and $1 billion, and $10 billion. For this subset, 
the ABOVE/BELOW ratio is 1.87 and the binomial p-value is highly significant (<0.001). 
Underlying the simple binomial test is the assumption that each observation is 
independent. This condition is satisfied for the small bin widths, but the large bin widths have 
overlapping regions, and observations in the ABOVE bin for one threshold point can be in the 
BELOW bin for another threshold point. For example, consider the largest bin width log 0.1000, 
or 25.89% of revenue. A revenue observation of $990,000 is clearly in the BELOW bin for the 
$1,000,000 threshold point, but it is also in the ABOVE bins for the $800,000 and $900,000 
threshold points. The approximate randomization test described earlier does not require the 
assumption of independent observations. In Table 3 we provide p-values generated by the 
approximate randomization procedure for the full set of combined thresholds. These statistics 
allow us to estimate the combined significance of the threshold effect across all of the thresholds 
reported individually in Table 2 using an unbiased test statistic. 
In Table 3, Panel A we report values of Sj, the ratio of the number of revenue 
observations in the bin just above a threshold point to the number of observations in the bin just 
below that same threshold point for a variety of bin widths around the thresholds. Consistent 
with the results in Table 2 for just the 0.0010 bin width, the number of ABOVE observations 
exceeds the number of BELOW observations for all bin widths. For each bin width, we report a 
binomial probability that we would observe that many observations in the ABOVE bins relative 
to the BELOW bins if the true underlying probability of an observation falling in one of the bins 
is 50%. The binomial p-values are less than 0.01 for all bin widths, indicating that it is very 
unlikely that this would occur by random chance. As seen in the far right column of Table 3, 
Panel A, the approximate randomization p-values agree with the binomial p-values for the small 
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bin widths, but for the large bin widths, particularly 25.89% in which there are many 
observations counted more than once, the approximate randomization results demonstrate that 
the simple binomial test overstates the statistical significance of the ABOVE/BELOW ratio. 
With that said, for all bin widths from log 0.0010 (0.23% of revenue) through log 0.0500 
(12.20% of revenue), the approximate randomization p-values are less than 0.01 demonstrating 
that there are significantly more reported revenue numbers just above a base-ten threshold than 
just below a base-ten threshold, supporting our hypothesis that managers manage reported 
revenues to reach these base-ten benchmarks. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 One issue to consider with respect to the test statistics in Panel A is that the observation 
counts in the ABOVE and BELOW bins for the different bin widths are cumulative, meaning 
that if an observation is in the ABOVE bin for the 0.23% bin width in Table 3, Panel A, that 
same observation is also in the ABOVE bin for the 25.89% bin width. Part, or all, of the 
significant difference in the ABOVE/BELOW number of observations for the larger bin widths 
could therefore be the result of the differences for the smaller bin widths. This is analogous to a 
significant five-day abnormal market return being the result of four days of zero abnormal 
returns and one day with a large abnormal return. Intuitively, it seems unrealistic that firms 
would be able and desirous to manage revenues to increase them by 9.65% or 12.20% (two of 
the significant bin widths in Table 3, Panel A) in order to reach a base-ten revenue threshold. 
To explore this issue, we tabulate observations in incremental revenue bands, as shown in 
Table 3, Panel B. For example, we see in Panel A that there are 32,475 observations in the 
ABOVE bins within 2.33% of a base-ten threshold. However, only 15,692 of these observations 
are in the band close to the upper limit of 2.33%, in the band between 1.16% and 2.33% above a 
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base-ten threshold point. We use these incremental observation counts (i.e. observations in the 
current bin width that were not included in the next smallest bin) to generate new ratios and 
associated approximate randomization p-values. The incremental p-values of only the four 
smallest bins are significant at the 5% level.
9
 These incremental results suggest that firms are 
desirous and able to manage revenues within about a 2.33% range to reach base-ten threshold 
points. The statistical significance for wider bins results from the holdover effect from the 
ABOVE/BELOW difference for the narrower bins. In subsequent tables, we focus on reporting 
results just for this set of narrower bins.
10
 
The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 are interesting but still have the potential to be 
driven to some extent by less opportunistic reasons than managers’ desire to beat base-ten 
cognitive thresholds. For example, additional rounding of revenue numbers could have been 
introduced by the data-provider when aggregating the revenue data. Alternatively, managers 
might have a tendency to subconsciously round up all reported accounting numbers because of 
the appealing properties of round numbers discussed earlier. In that case, managers would not 
consciously be targeting base-ten revenue thresholds specifically, and would be just as likely to 
round up numbers that are not usually subject to upwards management such as cost of goods 
sold. Finally, prior studies examining base-ten thresholds for reported earnings numbers have 
identified these irregularities by examining the distribution of the digits in reported numbers. A 
digits-based methodology must take into account Benford’s Law, which demonstrates that digits 
in naturally-occurring numbers are not uniformly distributed and that numbers with a second 
                                                          
9
 Note that the incremental p-value in Panel B for 0.0010 is the same as in Panel A because it is the smallest bin 
width and therefore is essentially only incremental to a bin width of 0. 
10
 The total number of observations used in Panel B is slightly lower than the number used in Panel A because of our 
minimum observation restrictions (309,369 vs. 309,411 and 311,539 vs. 311,745 in the lower and upper bins, 
respectively). By looking at incremental bin widths, we are essentially looking at sets of much smaller bins which 
are more likely to include too few observations to be included in the statistical analysis. 
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digit of 0 (e.g., 500) are more likely to occur than numbers with a second digit of 9 (e.g., 490).
11
 
However, Benford’s Law most accurately describes sets of numbers that span several orders of 
magnitude and does not describe the distribution of numbers at adjacent points on the number 
line. In other words, Benford’s Law does not imply any sort of discontinuity in the distribution of 
numbers, and is a less likely explanation for our results. 
To rule out all three of the above possible mechanisms as the cause of our results in 
Tables 2 and 3, we compare the ABOVE/BELOW ratios for the revenue thresholds with those 
for cost of goods sold, total assets, and market capitalization. We label these comparisons “ratio-
of-ratios tests” because we compare the Sj statistics (aggregate threshold ABOVE/BELOW ratio) 
for revenue with the Sj statistics of the other metrics. Finding elevated ABOVE/BELOW ratios 
in revenue data beyond those in these other three data items would suggest that managers are 
motivated to take actions to increase revenue to reach these base-ten revenue thresholds above 
and beyond any intentional or unintentional behavior on the part of managers to manage these 
other numbers. We choose these three data items as controls because total assets, market 
capitalization, and cost of goods sold are all, on average, of the same order of magnitude as 
revenue. Cost of goods sold is a particularly apt benchmark because it is generated by similar 
processes that lead to revenues, has a similar distribution in terms of magnitude, and is much less 
likely to be strategically managed to exceed base-ten thresholds. Because managers could 
                                                          
11
 Casual intuition suggests that each of the nine digits 1 through 9 is equally likely to appear as the first digit in a 
reported revenue number and that each of the ten digits 0 through 9 is equally likely to appear as the second digit, 
but this is not the case. For example, according to Benford’s Law, in a set of numerical data, the first digit will be 
“1” 30.1% of the time and will be “9” only 4.6% of the time. For numbers of two digits or more, the second digit 
will be “0” 12.0% of the time and “9” only 8.5% of the time. Benford’s Law arises naturally out of any exponential 
growth process. Benford’s Law also emerges naturally for any data set in which the observed values are randomly 
drawn from different distributions, and this phenomenon has been shown to be true in accounting data (Nigrini 
1996; Nigrini and Mittermaier 1997). Amiram et al. (2015) use deviations from Benford’s Law to calculate a 
measure of financial statement data quality and predict material misstatements. 
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potentially have incentives to manipulate upward both total assets and total market value of 
equity, these benchmarks place an even higher bar for the magnitude of the base-ten threshold 
effect in revenues in order to find significant results.
12
 
Using cost of goods sold as an illustration, the test statistic, Vj, for these ratio-of-ratios 
tests is the ratio of the separate Sj statistics for revenue and cost of goods sold.  
(3)    𝑉𝑗 =  
𝑆𝑗,𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑆𝑗,𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
 
where Sj,Revenue is the ratio of the number of ABOVE and BELOW observations in bin width j 
around all base-ten thresholds for revenue and Sj,COGS is the same ratio for cost of goods sold. If 
managers have incentives to manage reported revenue to exceed base-ten thresholds above and 
beyond any threshold effect that may exist for cost of goods sold, then this Vj ratio should be 
greater than one. A similar ratio-of-ratios test statistic is computed using total assets and market 
capitalization. 
We use a similar approximate randomization test as described earlier to determine 
whether the Vj ratio is significantly greater than one, now randomly selecting points from both 
the revenue and comparison metric distributions. Data comparing the magnitude of the base-ten 
threshold effect in reported revenue numbers to the corresponding effect in cost of goods sold, 
total assets, and market value of equity are presented in Table 4. The data in Panel A relate to 
base-ten thresholds in cost of goods sold. For each bin width, the ratio of ABOVE-to-BELOW 
cost of goods sold observations is greater than one, indicating that some amount of innocuous 
rounding by the firm or data provider is occurring, even for cost of goods sold. 
                                                          
12
 Although firms have more difficulty in directly managing ending market capitalization for an accounting reporting 
period than in managing reported revenues or assets, evidence such as in Iliev (2010) suggests that firms can 
exercise some influence on the level of end-of-period market values (in his case he examines public float). 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
The excess of ABOVE-to-BELOW observations for cost of goods sold provides a 
benchmark for the magnitude of the threshold-reaching effect in the revenue numbers. The ratio-
of-ratios analysis shown in Table 4, Panel A demonstrates that for each of the bin widths 
reported, there is a significantly greater proportion of revenue observations, relative to cost of 
goods sold observations, just above a base-ten threshold; the approximate randomization p-value 
reported in the final column is less than 0.01 in each case. This ratio-of-ratios value is as high as 
1.430 for the 0.23% bin width. These results reconfirm that there is strong evidence that 
managers of firms with revenues close to a base-ten threshold make extra efforts to reach that 
threshold. 
In Table 4, Panels B and C, we report ratio-of-ratios comparisons for revenues with both 
total assets and market value of equity. As with the cost of goods sold comparison, the ratio of 
the number of observations falling in bins just above a base-ten threshold, relative to the number 
of observations just below that base-ten threshold, is significantly higher than for total assets 
(Panel B) and market value of equity (Panel C).  Taken together, the results reported in Table 4 
strongly support our prediction that firms are more likely to take strategic action to report 
revenues that are just above a base-ten threshold than just below. 
 Our prediction about base-ten threshold-reaching behavior is based on the nature of the 
reported numbers themselves and not on the underlying economic values. We predict the same 
effect to be evident in numbers reported in any currency. Accordingly, we repeat the ratio-of-
ratios analysis on international data to demonstrate the robustness of the base-ten revenue 
threshold effect and to show that this effect is not unique to the U.S. market or to U.S. dollars. 
The international results are shown in Table 5, Panels A and B. Two sets of results are given – 
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results for all base-ten threshold points (in Panel A) and results for just the six most prominent 
threshold points (in Panel B). Because the numerical nature of the hypothesized base-ten 
threshold effect is independent of any currency denomination, it is appropriate in this case to 
pool unadjusted revenue numbers across countries and currencies. In total, the results in Table 5 
represent revenue and cost of goods sold data from 140 different non-U.S. countries and 107 
different currencies.
13
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
We use 390,104 revenue observations from Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database. We use 
Osiris because it covers the greatest number of countries of any international accounting 
database (Dai 2012); although less commonly used in accounting research, it has been used in a 
variety of studies in finance (see John et al. 2008; Masulis et al. 2011). The approximate 
randomization p-values associated with the ratio-of-ratios tests for the Osiris data are all less than 
0.05 (less than 0.01 in most cases) and demonstrate that for all of the bin widths examined, using 
both the full set of thresholds (Panel A) and the most prominent thresholds (Panel B), managers 
in non-U.S. firms make efforts to increase reported revenue to reach base-ten thresholds. This 
result is quite striking because it has nothing to do with economic value and everything to do 
with the base-ten fixation of human number processing, in all currencies. 
 In sum, the results of Tables 2 through 5 provide strong support for our prediction that 
firms are more likely to report revenues that are just above a base-ten threshold than just below. 
We show that the effect is significant for revenue numbers within one or two percent of a base-
ten threshold. Using a ratio-of-ratios test with cost of goods sold, total assets, and market value 
                                                          
13
 Although most of the ratios tend to be greater in Panel B, the approximate randomization p-values tend to be 
smaller in Panel A. This is because all of the less prominent thresholds are included in the control group in Panel B 
which compares the most prominent thresholds with all other numbers. 
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of equity as control numbers, we also demonstrate that this base-ten revenue threshold effect is 
incremental to any effect of non-strategic rounding. Finally, we show that the base-ten revenue 
threshold effect exists even when aggregating more than 60 years of unadjusted revenue data and 
when aggregating non-U.S. revenue numbers reported in a variety of currencies.
14
 This base-ten 
revenue threshold effect is not associated with any measure of economic value in the reported 
revenue numbers but is instead driven by cognitive fixation on base-ten thresholds. 
Analyst Revenue Forecasts 
Analyst forecasts establish a performance expectation for both managers and market 
participants. If revenue forecasts exhibit the existence of a base-ten threshold, this is one more 
reason for managers to make efforts to reach base-ten thresholds in reported revenues. We 
explore the existence of a base-ten threshold effect in analysts’ revenue forecasts in Table 6. The 
underlying data are analyst revenue forecasts obtained from the IBES database for the years 1996 
through 2013. We focus on the first forecast as well as the final forecast; the final forecast is the 
one made closest to the announcement of actual revenue. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The results in Table 6, Panels A and B confirm that a base-ten threshold effect exists in analysts’ 
annual revenue forecasts. In both panels a ratio-of-ratios test is employed. Panel A contains 
results for the first forecast, compared to actual cost of goods sold, and Panel B contains results 
for the final forecast, also compared to actual cost of goods sold. For both the first revenue 
forecast and the final revenue forecast, for each of the four bin widths reported, the approximate 
randomization test reveals the existence of a strongly significant base-ten threshold effect. These 
                                                          
14
 Although our tests include data from as early as the 1950s, this base-ten revenue threshold phenomenon persists 
today and can be observed in the data even when restricting the sample to include only those firm-years occurring 
after the year 2000. 
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results confirm that not only does the base-ten threshold effect exist in actual reported revenue, 
but it also exists in analysts’ forecasts of revenue. 
 Table 6, Panel C reports the results of a ratio-of-ratios comparison between the first 
revenue forecast and the final revenue forecast allowing us to compare the strength of the 
revenue threshold effect in analyst forecasts issued closer to and further from the earnings 
announcement date. For the three narrowest bin widths, the approximate randomization test 
confirms that the base-ten threshold effect is significantly stronger in the first revenue forecast 
relative to the final forecast. Consistent with H2b, the fact that the base-ten threshold effect is 
stronger in earlier forecasts suggests that analysts are more likely to fixate on a base-ten heuristic 
when faced with greater uncertainty early in the forecasting period when they have less 
information about actual firm performance during the period. 
 Table 6, Panels D and E report the results of a ratio-of-ratios comparison between actual 
reported revenue and the first and last revenue forecast, respectively. The Panel D results 
demonstrate that the base-ten threshold effect is significantly stronger in the early analysts’ 
revenue forecasts than in the actual reported revenues; the approximate randomization p-value is 
significant for each of the four reported bin widths. Interestingly, the Panel E results reveal that 
the base-ten threshold effect in the last analyst forecasts exhibits the base-ten threshold effect to 
about the same degree as seen in the actual revenue numbers; the approximate randomization 
tests shows that the ratio of threshold ratios (Vj) is indistinguishable from one for each of the 
four bin widths. These results in Panel E suggest that part of the reason that firms meet base-ten 
thresholds in reported revenue is that managers are trying to meet analyst revenue forecasts 
which exhibit base-ten threshold effects. Overall, these results provide support for H2a and H2b. 
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Revenue Sensitivity 
We suggest that because there is greater attention to reported revenue for high price-to-
sales and high past revenue growth firms, these firms should benefit the most from meeting base-
ten revenue thresholds. Accordingly, H3a and H3b predict that the base-ten revenue threshold 
effect is stronger among high price-to-sales ratio and high past revenue growth firms. In Table 7, 
Panels A and B, we report results examining the relation of the base-ten threshold effect with 
past revenue growth and price-to-sales ratios, respectively. We define revenue growth as the 
percentage change in revenue from year t-1 to t (where t is the current year). Because this 
measure is correlated with current revenue, we use lagged values to sort firms into revenue 
growth deciles. Before constructing deciles, we exclude the extreme high and low 2% of the past 
revenue growth firm-years for the Panel A results and the price-to-sales ratio firm-years for the 
Panel B results to avoid our results being skewed by extreme positive and negative growth firms. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
In Table 7, Panel A we report the results of the ratio-of-ratios approximate randomization 
tests comparing the high past revenue growth firm-years (the highest revenue growth decile) and 
low past revenue growth firms (the lowest revenue growth decile). These results indicate that 
past revenue growth does appear to have a significant effect on the tendency of a firm to attempt 
to reach the next higher base-ten threshold point. For all three of the narrowest bin widths, the p-
value of the approximate randomization test is less than 0.05. These results are consistent with 
the idea that managers in firms with high past revenue growth are more motivated to seek the 
positive attention stemming from reaching base-ten reference points. 
In Table 7, Panel B we report the results of the ratio-of-ratios approximate randomization 
tests comparing the highest decile of price-to-sales firm-years and the lowest decile of price-to-
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sales ratio firm years. One determinate of price-to-sales ratios is investors’ expectation of future 
revenue growth. Again, for all three of the narrowest bin widths, the p-value of the approximate 
randomization test is less than 0.10, with the 0.0010 and 0.0050 bin widths having a p-value less 
than 0.05. These results suggest that managers in high price-to-sales firms are more likely to 
expend the efforts necessary to reach a base-ten revenue threshold, consistent with the revenue 
threshold effect being strongest for firms which have the greatest incentives to report strong 
revenue numbers. 
Increased Press Coverage 
We suggest that one motivation for rational managers to spend time, money, and effort in 
reaching base-ten revenue thresholds is that reaching these thresholds results in increased public 
visibility for the firm. We measure this public visibility by extent of press coverage. To provide 
evidence that firms experience increased recognition/exposure resulting from reaching a base-ten 
threshold, for the calendar years 1979 through 2012 we identify a sample of firm-years which 
have press coverage available in the Factiva database and have just exceeded, by less than 
2.33%, the $1 billion threshold for the first time.
15
 We compare the press coverage in the 
threshold year to the press coverage in the prior year. For this test we focus our examination of 
press coverage in the week surrounding the announcement of 4
th
 quarter earnings. We measure 
the level of press coverage by querying the Factiva database manually, firm-year by firm-year, 
for all news outlets covered in Factiva, and tabulating the total number of articles written about 
the firm in the week surrounding the announcement of annual earnings (three days before, the 
announcement date, and three days after). We collect the same data for the prior year earnings 
                                                          
15
 We focus on the $1 billion threshold because news coverage data is not available for many firms with lower levels 
of revenue and because we anticipate that the strength of the response to this prominent base-ten threshold would 
give the statistical tests enough power to detect an effect even with the limited sample size. 
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announcement period. Press coverage for a particular firm-year is defined to be the total number 
of articles (including duplicates) in this week-long window. We include duplicates because, for 
our purposes, we are interested in the total volume of press coverage and not in the number of 
unique press articles. Therefore, if an article originally reported in The New York Times was 
reprinted in The Kansas City Star, for example, both articles constitute part of the overall press 
coverage for the firm in question. 
The results of this press coverage analysis are reported in Table 8, Panel A. Of the 163 
firm-years sampled, 82 have press coverage that was higher in the year they reached the billion-
dollar benchmark, 29 have the same amount of press coverage, and 52 display a decrease in 
overall press coverage. For a statistical test of significance, we follow traditional practice 
(Randles 2001) and ignore the no-change observations. We compare the number of press 
coverage increase firm-years to the number of decrease firm-years using a binomial test. The 
number of press coverage increase firm-years is significantly greater, with a p-value of 0.006. 
These results provide evidence that, on average, firms experience an increase in press coverage 
in the year that they reach the billion-dollar revenue benchmark. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
 A weakness of this press coverage analysis is that we do not control for press coverage 
changes for similar firm-years that are not associated with the reaching of a base-ten revenue 
threshold. Accordingly, for our second news coverage test, we use a broader sample and a 
matched-pair design to provide further evidence of a significant increase in press coverage. For 
this broader analysis we use automated extraction techniques to download articles for firms with 
revenues near both the $1 billion and $500 million thresholds. This broader firm coverage is 
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essential to provide the matched sample for our second news coverage test, but limits our 
analysis to articles on Factiva originally provided by PR Newswire.  
The results of our second news coverage analysis are contained in Table 8, Panel B. We 
identify 225 firm-years from the period 1990 through 2012 for which reported revenue exceeded 
either the $500 million threshold or the $1 billion threshold for the first time and for which we 
have press coverage data in the current and prior years. The matched sample includes firm-years 
in the same two-digit SIC code and year with revenue within 50% of the base-ten threshold and 
total assets within 50% of the total assets of the matched firm. We impose the additional 
restriction that the revenue of firms in the matched sample not cross the base-ten threshold 
during the two-year period before and after the test firms cross the thresholds of interest for the 
first time; revenues must be either above or below the threshold for both years. This process 
identified 898 matching firm-years for the 225 sample firm-years. We define three categories of 
relative news coverage change, as follows: 
 Relative decrease: Threshold firm news coverage decreased while match firm news 
coverage either stayed the same or increased or threshold firm news coverage stayed the 
same while match firm news coverage increased. 
 No relative change: Threshold firm news coverage and the match firm news coverage 
both decreased, both stayed the same, or both increased. 
 Relative increase: Threshold firm news coverage increased while match firm news 
coverage either stayed the same or decreased or threshold firm news coverage stayed the 
same while match firm news coverage decreased. 
 As seen in Table 8, Panel B, the ratio of the number of relative increases to decreases is 
1.14, with a binomial test p-value of 0.060, offering support of the claim that surpassing a base-
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ten revenue threshold results in a relative increase in press coverage. We repeat the test using 
only the closest match below the threshold and the closest match above the threshold. For some 
sample firm-years, there was not both an appropriate “above” matching firm-year and 
appropriate “below” matching firm-year, so the total number of matches for this comparison is 
306. As seen in Table 8, Panel B, the ratio of relative press coverage increases to decreases is 
1.31, and the binomial test p-value is 0.030. Overall, the results reported in Table 8, Panels A 
and B provide support for the prediction in H4 that reaching a base-ten revenue threshold results 
in a relative increase in press coverage. Accordingly, to the extent that increased visibility brings 
benefits to a firm, managers are indeed justified in expending efforts to increase reported revenue 
to exceed an attainable base-ten threshold. 
Future Revenue Growth 
 H5 predicts that the effort to reach a base-ten revenue threshold is, in part, unsustainable 
and that future revenue growth for firms reporting revenue just above a base-ten threshold is 
lower than for a control set of firms. We use the $1 billion revenue threshold and identify all 
firm-years with reported revenue within 2.33% (log 0.0100) below $1 billion, and all firm-years 
within 2.33% above $1 billion. For each observation we also require that revenue data be 
available for the year before, the year of, and the year after reported revenue is close to the $1 
billion threshold. This procedure yields 248 firm-years with revenue just below the $1 billion 
threshold and 301 firm-years with revenue just above the $1 billion threshold. We compute 
revenue growth rates in the year that the firm is close to the $1 billion threshold and in the year 
following. The results are reported in Table 9, Panel A. For the firm-years with revenue just 
below the $1 billion threshold, the mean (median) revenue increase in the first year is 10.6% 
(8.4%), insignificantly different from the mean (median) revenue increase in the following year 
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of 9.8% (8.7%). In contrast, for the firm-years with revenue just above the $1 billion threshold, 
the mean (median) revenue increase in the following year of 6.4% (6.8%) is significantly lower 
than the revenue increase in the year the threshold was reached of 14.5% (10.3%). Note that it 
was this elevated revenue growth of 14.5% that allowed these firms to report revenue in excess 
of the $1 billion threshold. These results suggest that some firms stretch to reach base-ten 
revenue thresholds and that this high revenue growth is not sustainable. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
  
Table 9, Panel B confirms this unsustainability result using a matched sample design. For 
the same firm-years examined in Panel A (with revenue within 2.33% of $1 billion), a set of 
matched firm-years is constructed using firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year with 
revenue that is within 10% of the $1 billion threshold but which is not within 2.33% of the 
threshold. We also require that total assets in the matched firm-years be within 50% of the total 
assets of the sample threshold firms. Each near-threshold and match firm pair is categorized 
based on whether the revenue growth rate increased or decreased in the following year relative to 
the revenue growth rate from the preceding year. Similar to our news coverage tests, we define 
three categories of relative revenue growth rate change, as follows: 
 Relative decrease: Near-threshold firm revenue growth rate decreased while match firm 
revenue growth rate increased. 
 Same: Near-threshold firm revenue growth rate and the match firm revenue growth rate 
both decreased or both increased. 
 Relative increase: Near-threshold firm revenue growth rate increased while match firm 
revenue growth rate decreased. 
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 As seen in Table 9, Panel B, for near-threshold firm-years with revenue just below the $1 
billion threshold, the ratio of relative revenue growth rate increases to decreases is 1.02, 
insignificantly different from one and indicating that for the near-threshold firms that did not 
stretch to reach the $1 billion revenue threshold, revenue growth in the following year was 
indistinguishable from that of a matched set of firms. For the firm-years with revenue just above 
the $1 billion threshold, the ratio of relative growth rate increases to decreases shrinks 
dramatically to 0.64, which is significantly less than one (p-value < 0.01), indicating that revenue 
growth in the following year was significantly lower among threshold beaters than for a matched 
set of firms. Overall, the results in Table 9 demonstrate that the revenue growth needed to reach 
a representative base-ten threshold, $1 billion, is not sustainable, on average. 
  
V. Summary and Conclusions 
 Human fixation on base-ten thresholds is likely a consequence of an evolutionary path 
entered 340 million years ago when the common ancestor of amphibians, reptiles, birds, and 
mammals evolved to have five digits on each limb (Coates 2005). Humans have two hands and 
five fingers on each hand, so counting systems around the world are designed around the number 
10. Other alternatives (such as base 2, base 8, base 12, and base 60) exist, but the base-ten 
counting system predominates. 
In this paper we show that this non-economic base-ten legacy of evolutionary biology has 
a measurable effect on the actions of managers, financial analysts, news media, and, by 
implication, the broader set of market participants who respond to the numbers produced by 
managers and analysts. We find that firms tend to report revenues just meeting or beating base-
ten thresholds, and this phenomenon occurs in the accounting numbers of firms reporting in a 
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variety of countries in a variety of currencies. Although unusual patterns in earnings have been 
documented in prior research, our paper is the first to document the existence of a base-ten 
threshold effect in revenues and underscores the importance that managers place on the reported 
revenue number, independent of its contribution to bottom-line earnings. 
Our result is not inconsistent with rational behavior on the part of managers. We find that 
analyst forecasts of revenues exhibit this effect, and that it is stronger early in the forecasting 
period when analysts are faced with greater uncertainty, and therefore more likely to rely on 
heuristics, than later in the forecasting period when they have more information. This suggests 
that managers may be rationally responding to external incentives to beat these benchmarks. 
Further, managers of firms for which share prices are most sensitive to changes in market 
perceptions about future revenues, such as firms with high past revenue growth or with high 
price-to-sales ratios, are more likely to take actions to reach base-ten thresholds. Additionally, 
market participants apparently respond to the reaching of these thresholds; we show that press 
coverage of firms reaching a base-ten threshold increases relative to press coverage of a matched 
control group of firms. Finally, we find that the efforts needed to push reported revenue above a 
base-ten threshold are not sustainable; revenue growth in the following year is significantly 
lower than revenue growth in a matched control sample. Combined, these results are the first to 
date which provide evidence on both the motives for and intended and unintended consequences 
of managing accounting numbers to meet base-ten thresholds. 
 The base-ten revenue threshold effects that we document in this study are exhibited in 
audited financial statement data. However, it is also likely that this base-ten threshold 
phenomenon exists in the unaudited financial statements of privately-held businesses which face 
less scrutiny. Additionally, strategic actions to reach base-ten thresholds are likely to exist in 
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internal accounting numbers such as revenue budgets, targets, and internal forecasts. Our results 
suggest that all reported revenue numbers that just exceed a base-ten threshold by one or two 
percent may be less reliable than revenue numbers from other points along the number line. 
Considering the large number of base-ten thresholds present in reported accounting numbers, we 
believe this has far-reaching implications for the use of these revenue numbers and their 
associated earnings numbers by academics and practitioners. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Examples of Organizations Reporting Salient Numbers Around Base-Ten Thresholds 
 
1. Starbucks: “Poised To Join $1 Billion-a-Year Club” (September 1997) 
In September 1997 Starbucks Chairman Howard Schultz spoke to investors about current and 
future financial performance. Schultz forecasted sales for the current period of $950 to $980 
million, and predicted that sales would exceed $1 billion in the next fiscal year. This focus on 
reaching $1 billion in sales led to several news articles highlighting this point. The Seattle Times 
included an article titled “Starbucks Poised to Join $1 Billion-a-year Club” on September 21, 
1997. This article was picked up by other news agencies, including the Orlando Sentinel. 
2. Callaway Golf: “Exceeded the billion-dollar mark” (April 2007)  
The President and CEO of Callaway Golf George Fellows made a point to specifically highlight 
reaching $1 billion in sales for the first time in the 2006 annual report. The firm reported annual 
sales of $1.018 billion, and Fellows stated that for “the first time we have exceeded the billion-
dollar mark” in his 25th Anniversary of Callaway Golf Company letter to shareholders. 
3. Heinz: Achieves Record Sales of Over $10 Billion (May 2008) 
H.J. Heinz Company reported 12% sales growth to post record sales of $10.1 billion for fiscal 
year 2007. Reaching this sales threshold led Business Wire to publish an article titled “Heinz 
Achieves Record Sales of Over $10 Billion…” on May 29, 2008. 
4. Facebook: First Reported Earnings of $1.000 billion (February 2012) 
Facebook Inc. went public in May 2012. In February 2012 the company publicly released its full 
financial results for the first time in its history. The most recent earnings reported in that first 
public release were for the year ended December 31, 2011. The reported earnings amount was 
exactly $1.000 billion. One conclusion is that Facebook wanted to make sure that in the run-up to 
its long-anticipated IPO the company would enhance its reputation among investors by 
financially elevating itself above the ranks of small, startup technology companies into the elite 
set of “billion dollar companies.” 
5. U.S. Federal Government 2016 Budget Proposal (February 2015) 
A “negative” threshold effect is evident in the fiscal 2016 federal budget submitted by U.S. 
President Obama in February 2015. The president’s budget proposed fiscal 2016 spending of 
$3.99 trillion. The Wall Street Journal editorial board found something strategic in this particular 
number, writing: “The budget gnomes must have been told that, whatever you do, keep the top 
line below $4 trillion.” (The Wall Street Journal. Editorial board. “Obama Unchained.” February 
2, 2015.) 
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APPENDIX 2 
Minimum Observation Criterion 
 
Although we identify 53 potential salient thresholds that we test using our approximate 
randomization technique, not all 53 thresholds are included in all analyses reported in the paper. 
In particular, the most extreme small and large thresholds are sometimes excluded from the 
analysis using certain bin widths in order to avoid distorted results from small sample sizes in the 
tails of the distribution. We impose restrictions based on the sample size and bin width. Our 
baseline bin width is 0.0100. For analyses using this bin width, the minimum number of 
observations is 0.0075% of the sample size, rounded up to the nearest integer. All other bin 
widths have a similar minimum number, based on their size relative to 0.0100; for example, the 
0.1000 bin width analysis requires 10 times as many observations, and the 0.0010 bin width 
analysis requires one-tenth the number of observations. All potential thresholds that lie beyond 
thresholds that were excluded because of small numbers of observations are also excluded; that 
is, we “cut off the tails.” This procedure generally excludes the most extreme top and bottom 1% 
of the data, and similar results are obtained when simply truncating the data. The smallest 
number of threshold points included in our main tests using our minimum observations criterion 
is 43 (for the 0.0010 bin width) and the largest number of threshold points included is 53 (for the 
0.0250 and 0.0400 bin widths). 
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Total Compustat Osiris
50s and 60s 32,651                   32,651                  0
70s 52,257                   52,257                  0
80s 77,209                   67,233                  9,976                    
90s 142,718                  89,135                  53,583                  
2000s 287,081                  79,423                  207,658                 
2010s* 149,133                  30,246                  118,887                 
741,049                350,945               390,104               
*2010-2014
Observations from Compustat and Osiris are required to have non-missing values of
current total assets and revenues. Unconsolidated entities are excluded. The Osiris
data exclude all U.S. firms. 
Table 1. Number of Firm-Year Observations
By Decade and Data Source
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Log Value
$500,000 5.698970 12 63 5.25 0.000
$600,000 5.778151 9 37 4.11 0.000
$700,000 5.845098 15 34 2.27 0.005
$800,000 5.903090 13 41 3.15 0.000
$900,000 5.954243 21 53 2.52 0.000
$1,000,000 6.000000 24 59 2.46 0.000
$2,000,000 6.301030 30 73 2.43 0.000
$3,000,000 6.477121 29 82 2.83 0.000
$4,000,000 6.602060 40 101 2.53 0.000
$5,000,000 6.698970 44 117 2.66 0.000
$6,000,000 6.778151 62 112 1.81 0.000
$7,000,000 6.845098 51 122 2.39 0.000
$8,000,000 6.903090 80 129 1.61 0.000
$9,000,000 6.954243 78 121 1.55 0.001
$10,000,000 7.000000 66 148 2.24 0.000
$20,000,000 7.301030 81 145 1.79 0.000
$30,000,000 7.477121 104 161 1.55 0.000
$40,000,000 7.602060 93 148 1.59 0.000
$50,000,000 7.698970 122 167 1.37 0.005
$60,000,000 7.778151 119 143 1.20 0.078
$70,000,000 7.845098 124 140 1.13 0.178
$80,000,000 7.903090 111 153 1.38 0.006
$90,000,000 7.954243 127 162 1.28 0.023
$100,000,000 8.000000 101 162 1.60 0.000
$200,000,000 8.301030 93 137 1.47 0.002
$300,000,000 8.477121 99 122 1.23 0.069
$400,000,000 8.602060 92 118 1.28 0.042
$500,000,000 8.698970 88 129 1.47 0.003
$600,000,000 8.778151 83 116 1.40 0.012
$700,000,000 8.845098 74 89 1.20 0.136
$800,000,000 8.903090 66 86 1.30 0.062
$900,000,000 8.954243 77 85 1.10 0.291
Table 2. Distribution of Revenue Observations Around Base-Ten Thresholds
Bin Width: Log 0.0010 = 0.23%
Panel A: All Base-Ten Thresholds
Number of Observations in
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10) for which a 
minimum number of observations exist in the ABOVE and BELOW bins (see Appendix 2). For the Log 0.0010 bin 
width, 43 threshold points (from $500,000 through $20,000,000) have the minumum number of observations.
Base-Ten 
Threshold Point
Bin 0.23% BELOW 
Threshold Point
Bin 0.23% ABOVE 
Threshold Point
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S 0.0010 )
Binomial p-
value
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$1,000,000,000 9.000000 53 86 1.62 0.003
$2,000,000,000 9.301030 55 75 1.36 0.048
$3,000,000,000 9.477121 46 46 1.00 0.541
$4,000,000,000 9.602060 31 38 1.23 0.235
$5,000,000,000 9.698970 29 38 1.31 0.164
$6,000,000,000 9.778151 23 39 1.70 0.028
$7,000,000,000 9.845098 27 26 0.96 0.608
$8,000,000,000 9.903090 29 27 0.93 0.656
$9,000,000,000 9.954243 27 27 1.00 0.554
$10,000,000,000 10.000000 13 26 2.00 0.027
$20,000,000,000 10.301030 11 14 1.27 0.345
2,572 3,997 1.55 0.000
Log Value
$1,000,000 6 24 59 2.46 0.000
$10,000,000 7 66 148 2.24 0.000
$100,000,000 8 101 162 1.60 0.000
$1,000,000,000 9 53 86 1.62 0.003
$10,000,000,000 10 13 26 2.00 0.027
257 481 1.87 0.000
Approximate randomization p-values significant at the 5% level bolded.
Prominent Thresholds Combined
All Thresholds Combined: S0.0010
Panel B: Most Prominent Base-Ten Thresholds
Number of Observations in
Base-Ten 
Threshold Point
Bin 0.23% BELOW 
Threshold Point
Bin 0.23% ABOVE 
Threshold Point
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S 0.0010 )
Binomial p-
value
For all Thresholds of the form T=10
K
, for integers K (5 through 10)
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0.0010 0.23% 2,572                3,997               1.554 0.0000 0.0001
0.0025 0.58% 8,557                10,349             1.209 0.0000 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 14,560              16,783             1.153 0.0000 0.0001
0.0100 2.33% 29,922              32,475             1.085 0.0000 0.0001
0.0200 4.71% 60,767              63,459             1.044 0.0000 0.0001
0.0250 5.93% 76,264              79,150             1.038 0.0000 0.0001
0.0400 9.65% 122,585            125,296           1.022 0.0000 0.0001
0.0500 12.20% 153,506            156,307           1.018 0.0000 0.0015
0.0750 18.85% 231,680            234,206           1.011 0.0001 0.0790
0.1000 25.89% 309,411            311,745           1.008 0.0015 0.2216
0 to 0.0010 0 to 0.23% 2,572                3,997               1.554 0.0000 0.0001
0.0010 to 0.0025 0.23% to 0.58% 5,955                6,213               1.043 0.0099 0.0044
0.0025 to 0.0050 0.58% to 1.16% 5,994                6,353               1.060 0.0006 0.0001
0.0050 to 0.0100 1.16% to 2.33% 15,362              15,692             1.021 0.0310 0.0123
0.0100 to 0.0200 2.33% to 4.71% 30,883              31,021             1.004 0.2909 0.2675
0.0200 to 0.0250 4.71% to 5.93% 15,351              15,556             1.013 0.1229 0.0989
0.0250 to 0.0400 5.93% to 9.65% 46,321              46,146             0.996 0.7186 0.6866
0.0400 to 0.0500 9.65% to 12.20% 31,026              31,123             1.003 0.3501 0.3836
0.0500 to 0.0750 12.20% to 18.85% 78,174              77,899             0.996 0.7576 0.6209
0.0750 to 0.1000 18.85% to 25.89% 77,731              77,539             0.998 0.6879 0.5526
Number of Observations in
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Bin BELOW 
Threshold 
Points
Table 3. Approximate Randomization Threshold Tests
Ratio of Above to Below Revenue Observations
Bin Widths: Log 0.0010 (0.23% ) - Log 0.1000 (25.89% )
Panel A: All Base-Ten Thresholds, All Bin Widths
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Band ABOVE 
Threshold 
Points
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j - ( j-1) )
Binomial 
p-value
This table presents the results of approximate randomization tests estimating the significance of the Threshold
Effect in reported revenues. Results for the full set of all Base-Ten thresholds is given in Panel A. In Panel B are
results for only the INCREMENTAL observations for each bin width, those within the given bin width that are
not included in the next smaller bin width. Each panel provides statistics for a variety of logged bin widths,
including the number of observations in the bins just above and below the threshold points, the associated
binomial test p-value (assuming an equal probability of observations falling in either bin), and the ratio of the
observations in the above and below bins (the test statistic used to generate the approximate randomization p-
value). Approximate randomization p-values significant at the 5% level bolded.
Bin ABOVE 
Threshold 
Points
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j )
Binomial 
p-value
Panel B: Incremental Observations -- All Base-Ten Thresholds, All Band Widths
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Number of Observations in
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Band Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Band Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Band BELOW 
Threshold 
Points
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0.0010 0.23% 1.554 1.086 1.430 0.0001
0.0025 0.58% 1.209 1.033 1.170 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 1.153 1.025 1.124 0.0001
0.0100 2.33% 1.085 1.010 1.075 0.0001
0.0010 0.23% 1.554 1.298 1.197 0.0001
0.0025 0.58% 1.209 1.107 1.093 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 1.153 1.074 1.074 0.0001
0.0100 2.33% 1.085 1.050 1.034 0.0006
0.0010 0.23% 1.554 1.082 1.437 0.0001
0.0025 0.58% 1.209 1.012 1.195 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 1.153 1.007 1.145 0.0001
0.0100 2.33% 1.085 1.013 1.072 0.0001
This table presents the results of approximate randomization tests estimating the significance of the Threshold
Effect for reported revenues relative to that of cost of goods sold, total assets, and market value of equity. Results
for the full set of all Base-Ten thresholds relative to cost of goods sold, total assets, and market value of equity are
given in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Each panel provides statistics for a variety of logged bin widths,
including the ratio of the number of observations in the bins just above and below the threshold points for revenue, 
cost of goods sold, total assets, and market value of equity, as well as the ratio of the revenue ratios to the ratios of
the three comparison items (the test statistic used to generate the approximate randomization p-value). Approximate
randomization p-values significant at the 5% level are bolded.
Market Value of 
Equity Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,MVE )
For all Thresholds of the form T = 10
K
, for integers K (5 through 10)
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Revenue /S j,MVE ) 
Panel C: All Base-Ten Thresholds, Revenue and Market Value of Equity Comparison
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Revenue Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Table 4. Ratio-of-Ratios Threshold Tests
Comparing the Threshold Effect of Revenue to that of Cost of Goods Sold, Total Assets, and Market 
Value of Equity
Bin Widths: Log 0.0010 (0.23% ) - Log 0.0100 (2.33% )
Panel A: All Base-Ten Thresholds, Revenue and Cost of Goods Sold Comparison
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Cost of Goods 
Sold Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,COGS )
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Revenue /S j,COGS ) 
Revenue Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Panel B: All Base-Ten Thresholds, Revenue and Total Assets Comparison
For all Thresholds of the form T = 10
K
, for integers K (5 through 10)
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Revenue Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Total Assets 
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Assets )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Revenue /S j,Assets ) 
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0.0010 0.23% 1.218 1.121 1.086 0.0337
0.0025 0.58% 1.128 1.053 1.071 0.0031
0.0050 1.16% 1.117 1.034 1.081 0.0002
0.0100 2.33% 1.081 1.030 1.050 0.0004
0.0010 0.23% 1.427 1.152 1.239 0.0302
0.0025 0.58% 1.281 1.057 1.212 0.0031
0.0050 1.16% 1.200 1.006 1.194 0.0005
0.0100 2.33% 1.147 1.019 1.126 0.0015
Cost of Goods 
Sold Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,COGS )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Revenue /S j,COGS ) 
For all Thresholds of the form T = 10
K
, for integers K (5 through 10)
This table presents the results of approximate randomization tests estimating the significance of the Threshold
Effect for reported revenues relative to that of cost of goods sold for a set of non-U.S. firms reporting in a variety of
currencies. The data in this table are taken from the Osiris database, as described in the discussion of Table 1.
Results for the full set of all Base-Ten thresholds and the set of only the most prominent thresholds are given in
Panels A and B, respectively. Each panel provides statistics for a variety of logged bin widths, including the ratio of 
the number of observations in the bins just above and below the threshold points for both revenue and cost of
goods sold, as well as the ratio of these ratios (the test statistic used to generate the approximate randomization p-
value). Approximate randomization p-values significant at the 5% level bolded.
Panel B: Most Prominent Base-Ten Thresholds, All Bin Widths, Revenue and Cost of Goods 
Sold Comparison
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Revenue Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Table 5. Ratio-of-Ratios Threshold Tests: Non-U.S. Firms
Demonstrating the Existence of the Threshold Effect in a Variety of Countries and Currencies
Bin Widths: Log 0.0010 (0.23% ) - Log 0.0100 (2.33% )
Panel A: All Base-Ten Thresholds, All Bin Widths, Revenue and Cost of Goods Sold 
Comparison
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Revenue Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Cost of Goods 
Sold Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,COGS )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Revenue /S j,COGS ) 
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
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0.0010 0.23% 1.955 1.086 1.800 0.0001
0.0025 0.58% 1.360 1.033 1.316 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 1.229 1.025 1.199 0.0001
0.0100 2.33% 1.119 1.010 1.109 0.0001
0.0010 0.23% 1.559 1.086 1.435 0.0001
0.0025 0.58% 1.233 1.033 1.193 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 1.156 1.025 1.127 0.0001
0.0100 2.33% 1.098 1.010 1.087 0.0001
0.0010 0.23% 1.955 1.559 1.254 0.0007
0.0025 0.58% 1.360 1.233 1.103 0.0012
0.0050 1.16% 1.229 1.156 1.064 0.0053
0.0100 2.33% 1.119 1.098 1.020 0.1404
Table 6. Analyst Revenue Forecast Threshold Tests
Comparing the Threshold Effect of Analyst Revenue Forecasts O ver Time and to Actual Revenue
Bin Widths 0.0010 - 0.0100
Panel A: First Analyst Revenue Forecast Compared to Actual Cost of Goods Sold
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,First_Rev /S j,COGS ) 
Panel B: Last Analyst Revenue Forecast Compared to Actual Cost of Goods Sold
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in terms 
of the common log 
of revenue)
Bin Width (in terms 
of percentage of 
revenue)
Last Revenue 
Forecast Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Last_Rev )
Actual Cost of 
Goods Sold Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,COGS )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Last_Rev /S j,COGS ) 
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in terms 
of the common log 
of revenue)
Bin Width (in terms 
of percentage of 
revenue)
First Revenue 
Forecast Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,First_Rev )
Actual Cost of 
Goods Sold Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,COGS )
Panel C: First Analyst Revenue Forecast Compared to Last Analyst Revenue Forecast
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in terms 
of the common log 
of revenue)
Bin Width (in terms 
of percentage of 
revenue)
First Revenue 
Forecast Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,First_Rev )
Last Revenue 
Forecast Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Last_Rev )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = S j,First_Rev / 
S j,Last_Rev ) 
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0.0010 0.23% 1.955 1.554 1.258 0.0010
0.0025 0.58% 1.360 1.211 1.123 0.0001
0.0050 1.16% 1.229 1.153 1.066 0.0012
0.0100 2.33% 1.119 1.085 1.031 0.0142
0.0010 0.23% 1.559 1.554 1.003 0.6108
0.0025 0.58% 1.233 1.211 1.018 0.3109
0.0050 1.16% 1.156 1.153 1.003 0.5011
0.0100 2.33% 1.098 1.085 1.012 0.2469
Panel D: First Analyst Revenue Forecast Compared to Actual Revenue
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in terms 
of the common log 
of revenue)
Bin Width (in terms 
of percentage of 
revenue)
First Revenue 
Forecast Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,First_Rev )
Actual Revenue 
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = S j,First_Rev / 
S j,Revenue ) 
This table presents the results of approximate randomization tests estimating the significance of the Threshold Effect
for analyst revenue forecasts.  The first and the last forecast made by each analyst before the earnings announcement 
of a given period is compared to various control groups including actual cost of goods sold and actual revenue. Each
panel presents results for the full set of all Base-Ten thresholds and provides statistics for four logged bin widths,
including the ratio of the number of observations in the bins just above and below the threshold points as well as the
ratio of these ratios (the test statistic used to generate the approximate randomization p-value). Approximate
randomization p-values significant at the 5% level bolded.
Panel E: Last Analyst Revenue Forecast Compared to Actual Revenue
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in terms 
of the common log 
of revenue)
Bin Width (in terms 
of percentage of 
revenue)
Last Revenue 
Forecast Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Last_Rev )
Actual Revenue 
Ratio 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Revenue )
Ratio of Ratios
(V j  = 
S j,Last_Rev /S j,Revenue
) 
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0.0010 0.23% 1.647 1.349 1.221 0.0148
0.0025 0.58% 1.229 1.130 1.088 0.0286
0.0050 1.16% 1.176 1.083 1.086 0.0080
0.0100 2.33% 1.086 1.061 1.024 0.1618
0.0010 0.23% 2.175 1.329 1.637 0.0387
0.0025 0.58% 1.308 1.090 1.200 0.0928
0.0050 1.16% 1.233 1.032 1.195 0.0179
0.0100 2.33% 1.160 1.051 1.104 0.0583
Table 7. Past Revenue Growth and Price-to-Sales Ratio Threshold Tests
Comparing the Threshold Effect for Firms with High and Low Past Revenue Growth
and High and Low Price-to-Sales Ratios
Bin Widths 0.0010 - 0.0100
Panel A: Firms with High Compared to Low Past Revenue Growth
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
This table presents the results of approximate randomization tests estimating the significance of the difference in
the Threshold Effect for high and low past revenue growth firms and price-to-sales ratios, where high (low)
growth (P/S ratio) is defined as the top (bottom) percentage revenue growth (P/S ratio) decile. Each panel
presents results for the full set of all Base-Ten thresholds and provides statistics for four logged bin widths,
including the ratio of the number of observations in the bins just above and below the threshold points as well
as the ratio of these ratios (the test statistic used to generate the approximate randomization p-value).
Approximate randomization p-values significant at the 5% level bolded.
Ratio of Ratios
(Vj = 
S j,High_Growth / 
S j,Low_Growth ) 
Panel B: Firms with a High Compared to Low Price-to-Sales Ratio
For all Thresholds of the form T = N x 10
K
, for integers N (1 through 9) and K (5 through 10)
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Highest Price-to-
Sales Ratio Decile 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,High_PS )
Lowest Price-to-
Sales Ratio Decile 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Low_PS )
Ratio of Ratios
(Vj = 
S j,High_PS / 
S j,Low_PS ) 
Approximate 
Randomization 
p-value
Bin Width (in 
terms of the 
common log of 
revenue)
Bin Width (in 
terms of 
percentage of 
revenue)
Highest Past 
Revenue Growth 
Decile 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,High_Growth )
Lowest Past Revenue 
Growth Decile 
ABOVE/BELOW
(S j,Low_Growth )
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Number of firm-years 52 29 82 1.58 0.006 ***
DECREASE
NO CHANGE
INCREASE
All Matches Within 
50%, Above and Below 280 299 319 1.14 0.060 *
Only Closest Revenue 
Match, Above and 
Below 90 98 118 1.31 0.030 **
DECREASE
NO CHANGE
INCREASE
***,**,* Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level.
Threshold firm news coverage decreased while match firm news coverage either stayed the 
same or increased OR threshold firm news coverage stayed the same while match firm news 
coverage increased.
Threshold firm news coverage and the match firm news coverage both decreased, both 
stayed the same, or both increased.
Threshold firm news coverage increased while match firm news coverage either stayed the 
same or decreased OR threshold firm news coverage stayed the same while match firm news 
coverage decreased.
Binomial p-
value
Binomial p-
value
Decrease in the number of articles mentioning the firm in the week surrounding the 
announcement of annual earnings, relative to the same period in the prior year.
No change in the number of articles mentioning the firm, relative to the same period in the 
prior year.
Increase in the number of articles in the Factiva database mentioning the firm in the week 
surrounding the announcement of annual earnings, relative to the same period in the prior 
year.
Panel B: Changes in News Coverage Compared to a Matched Sample -- $500 Million and 
$1 Billion Thresholds, PR Newswire  Only
Number of Threshold Firm-Years
Matching Firm-Years
News Coverage 
Relative 
DECREASE
NO CHANGE in 
Relative News 
Coverage
News Coverage 
Relative 
INCREASE
Ratio 
Increase/Decrease
Table 8. Threshold Firm-Years and Changes in News Coverage
Panel A: Changes in News Coverage -- $1 Billion Threshold, All News Outlets in Factiva
Number of Threshold Firm-Years
News Coverage 
Relative 
DECREASE
NO CHANGE in 
Relative News 
Coverage
News Coverage 
Relative 
INCREASE
Ratio 
Increase/Decrease
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t-statistic t-statistic
Last Year Next Year WRS-statistic Last Year Next Year WRS-statistic
$1 Billion Threshold
n = 248 n = 301
mean 10.6% 9.8% -0.419 14.5% 6.4% -5.309***
median
a
8.4% 8.7% -0.058 10.3% 6.8% -3.848***
The t-statistics are from a parametric difference test between the Last Year and Next Year revenue growth rates.
All Matches Within 
10%, Above and 
Below 307 720 314 1.02 0.595     
All Matches Within 
10%, Above and 
Below 389 871 250 0.64 0.000***
DECREASE
SAME
INCREASE
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
Just BELOW $1 billion Threshold
Just ABOVE $1 billion Threshold
Near-threshold firm revenue growth rate decreased while match firm revenue growth rate 
increased.
Near-threshold firm revenue growth rate and the match firm revenue growth rate both 
decreased or both increased.
Near-threshold firm revenue growth rate increased while match firm revenue growth rate 
decreased.
Binomial 
p-value
The WRS-statistics are from a nonparamentric difference test, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test, between the Last Year 
and Next Year revenue growth rates.
a
 Note that the BELOW WRS-statistic is negative even though the Next Year median is greater than the Last Year 
median. Strictly speaking, the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test is not a test of a difference in medians but instead is a test of a 
difference in distributions.
The BELOW firm-years are those with revenue below the threshold but within 2.33% of the threshold.
The ABOVE firm-years are those with revenue above the threshold but within 2.33% of the threshold.
Panel B: Changes in Revenue Growth -- Matched-Pair Comparison
Number of Near-Threshold Firm-Years
Revenue 
Growth Rate 
Relative 
DECREASE
SAME 
Relative 
Revenue 
Growth Rate
Revenue 
Growth Rate 
Relative 
INCREASE
Ratio 
Increase/
Decrease
Panel A: Changes in Revenue Growth -- Difference in Means
BELOW ABOVE
Table 9. Threshold Firm-Years and Future Revenue Growth
